Fundamentally fraught: the chaotic last weeks of the FRTB
Quick fixes should have no place in a sweeping three-year reform project
So, after more than three years of work on new trading book capital rules, this is how it ends: a confused, chaotic sprint to meet an arbitrary deadline; vital questions left unanswered; impacts unknown.
That's how the banks see it anyway. Of course, if you listen to banks, this is how every rule-making process ends – so the furore about the Fundamental review of the trading book (FRTB) might at first appear to be the usual case of a frustrated industry making a final, desperate roll of the dice. What's different this time is that some of the complaints are echoed by regulators who have been involved in the process.
A final round of changes to the FRTB was made when the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision belatedly decided to run a fourth quantitative impact study (QIS) in July. This, in itself, was evidence of the pressure regulators were under – it would have been more normal to consult on the changes, then to issue QIS instructions. But with the committee apparently under instructions to finish the rules this year, wholesale changes had to be made with no public consultation.
So, out went the asymmetric treatment of correlations – an element of the draft standardised approach that had produced a huge capital uplift relative to modelled numbers in the third QIS. In its place suddenly appeared an add-on for residual risk, in the form of a 1% charge on the notional of more exotic products. It had more or less the same effect as the mechanism it replaced – banks say it ended up accounting for almost half of the standardised charge. Where did the add-on come from? One regulator says: "There are people at the committee level that are very fearful of models. So they looked at this and said 'One percent of notional: why not? This is all the exotic stuff: what are they doing in this space anyway?' It was a quick and easy fix."
Based on the results of the fourth QIS, the impact of the add-on is expected to be scaled down – regulators say it should ultimately account for around 10% of the standardised capital total. Another quick fix.
But the FRTB was not supposed to be about quick fixes. It was an attempt to replace Basel 2.5 – an entirely necessary post-crisis repair job – with a coherent set of rules. Conceptually, a lot of it makes sense, and even banks would probably concede regulators are taking aim at the right targets, but there was a lot to do. And the banks are right to complain it has been rushed.
Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.
To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact info@risk.net or view our subscription options here: http://subscriptions.risk.net/subscribe
You are currently unable to print this content. Please contact info@risk.net to find out more.
You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact info@risk.net to find out more.
Copyright Infopro Digital Limited. All rights reserved.
As outlined in our terms and conditions, https://www.infopro-digital.com/terms-and-conditions/subscriptions/ (point 2.4), printing is limited to a single copy.
If you would like to purchase additional rights please email info@risk.net
Copyright Infopro Digital Limited. All rights reserved.
You may share this content using our article tools. As outlined in our terms and conditions, https://www.infopro-digital.com/terms-and-conditions/subscriptions/ (clause 2.4), an Authorised User may only make one copy of the materials for their own personal use. You must also comply with the restrictions in clause 2.5.
If you would like to purchase additional rights please email info@risk.net
More on Risk management
Regionals built first-line defences pre-CrowdStrike
In-business risk teams vary in size and reporting lines, but outage fears are a constant
Op risk data: Santander in car crash of motor-finance fail
Also: Macquarie fined for fake metals trade flaws, Metro makes AML misses, and Invesco red-faced over greenwashing. Data by ORX News
Public enemy number one: the threat to information security
Nearly half of domestic and regional banks report risk appetite breaches amid heightened sense of insecurity
Credit risk transfer, with a derivatives twist
Dealers angle to revive market that enables them to offload counterparty exposures, freeing up capital
Op Risk Benchmarking 2024: the banks
As threats grow and regulators bore down, focus shifts to the first line
Fed stress-testing operational readiness of discount window
Experts say consultation on improved ops should be accompanied by focus on willingness to borrow
Millennium risk manager defends leverage in basis trade
“Gross notional measures don’t equate to market risk,” says Scott Rofey
Banks feel regulatory heat on op resilience
Op Risk Benchmarking: supervisors dial up reporting expectations and on-site inspections