Corporate Governance Changes Following Reputational Damage in the Financial Industry

Ahmed Barakat

This chapter presents a theoretical discussion and empirical investigation of how financial firms respond to bad-news announcements that constitute possible causes of market-based reputational damage (namely, severe operational risk events and income-decreasing financial statement restatements). This topic is examined in terms of such firms making informed changes to their corporate governance structures and practices as a result of reputational damage. The chapter begins with a discussion of why it could (and should) be crucial for financial firms to apply substantial enhancements to their “tone-at-the-top” corporate governance mechanisms11CEO, numbers of non-CEO executive board directors and independent board directors, board size and board meeting frequency. following material bad-news announcements. Subsequently we examine and explain the data sources of bad-news announcements, tested variables, and the selection procedure of the sample comprising bad-news announcements in 75 US financial firms during the period 1995–2009. Next we analyse the market-based reputational damage caused by income-decreasing financial statement restatements and operational risk event announcements

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