Journal of Operational Risk

Risk.net

Unraveling Lebanon’s financial crisis: the path from promise to peril, delving into a risk strategist’s own experience

Mohammad Ibrahim Fheili

  • Post-Paris I optimism in Lebanon’s finances soured due to unchecked debt growth.
  • The crisis was rooted in weak governance and inadequate risk management.
  • There is an urgent need for improved communication to rebuild trust.
  • Comprehensive reforms are crucial for rebuilding trust.

This paper meticulously examines the path leading to Lebanon’s ongoing financial crisis, which began (or at least became evident) in 2019, analyzing pivotal risk factors that led to the disintegration of its once-prosperous banking sector. It offers a thorough review of the crisis, delving into its origins and presenting actionable recommendations to rebuild trust and stability. Key issues include banks’ heavy reliance on Lebanese government debt, governance failures eroding public trust and inherent weaknesses in the banking model, such as deposit dependence and inadequate risk diversification. This paper advocates for Lebanon’s banks to adopt modern practices, critiquing the false perception of banking sector health, regulatory failures and operational risks due to poor governance. The role of regulatory bodies such as the central bank and the financial intelligence unit in perpetuating risky behavior is discussed. A shift toward responsible lending practices, emphasizing the asset life cycle over the credit approval process, is proposed as vital for navigating the crisis and securing long-term stability.

Sorry, our subscription options are not loading right now

Please try again later. Get in touch with our customer services team if this issue persists.

New to Risk.net? View our subscription options

You need to sign in to use this feature. If you don’t have a Risk.net account, please register for a trial.

Sign in
You are currently on corporate access.

To use this feature you will need an individual account. If you have one already please sign in.

Sign in.

Alternatively you can request an individual account here