Managing XVA in the Ring-Fenced Bank

Robert Dargavel Smith

Contents

Introduction

Preface to Chapter 1

1.

Being Two-Faced over Counterparty Credit Risk

2.

Risky Funding: A Unified Framework for Counterparty and Liquidity Charges

3.

DVA for Assets

4.

Pricing CDSs’ Capital Relief

5.

The FVA Debate

6.

The FVA Debate: Reloaded

7.

Regulatory Costs Break Risk Neutrality

8.

Risk Neutrality Stays

9.

Regulatory Costs Remain

10.

Funding beyond Discounting: Collateral Agreements and Derivatives Pricing

11.

Cooking with Collateral

12.

Options for Collateral Options

13.

Partial Differential Equation Representations of Derivatives with Bilateral Counterparty Risk and Funding Costs

14.

In the Balance

15.

Funding Strategies, Funding Costs

16.

The Funding Invariance Principle

17.

Regulatory-Optimal Funding

18.

Close-Out Convention Tensions

19.

Funding, Collateral and Hedging: Arbitrage-Free Pricing with Credit, Collateral and Funding Costs

20.

Bilateral Counterparty Risk with Application to Credit Default Swaps

21.

KVA: Capital Valuation Adjustment by Replication

22.

From FVA to KVA: Including Cost of Capital in Derivatives Pricing

23.

Warehousing Credit Risk: Pricing, Capital and Tax

24.

MVA by Replication and Regression

25.

Smoking Adjoints: Fast Evaluation of Monte Carlo Greeks

26.

Adjoint Greeks Made Easy

27.

Bounding Wrong-Way Risk in Measuring Counterparty Risk

28.

Wrong-Way Risk the Right Way: Accounting for Joint Defaults in CVA

29.

Backward Induction for Future Values

30.

A Non-Linear PDE for XVA by Forward Monte Carlo

31.

Efficient XVA Management: Pricing, Hedging and Allocation

32.

Accounting for KVA under IFRS 13

33.

FVA Accounting, Risk Management and Collateral Trading

34.

Derivatives Funding, Netting and Accounting

35.

Managing XVA in the Ring-Fenced Bank

36.

XVA: A Banking Supervisory Perspective

37.

An Annotated Bibliography of XVA

Following the global financial crisis a number of different regulatory bodies have proposed the ring fencing of banks, with the primary aim of making them “safe” enough to be eligible for governmental guarantees of their deposits. The UK has the Independent Commission on Banking (known as “Vickers” after its chairman), Europe has the Report of the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Bank Structural Reform (the “Liikanen Report”) and the US has the Volcker rule.

While in spirit they may all agree, there are differences insofar as what activities are permitted (and with which counterparties) inside the ring-fenced banks (RFBs), and what activities must be relegated to the non-ring-fenced bank (NRFB). In particular, the Volcker rule insists on a full separation of proprietary-trading activities, which means that they must be spun off into separate companies. In order to prove that a credit value adjustment (CVA) desk is not engaging in prop trading, its hedges must be shown to be mitigating a “specific, identifiable risk”, raising some practical concerns (PwC 2014). One aspect is clear, however, and that is that all retail and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME)

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