How the Eurozone Crisis Became a Banking Crisis, and the Risk of Japanisation

Katsura Daikuhara

This chapter will discuss the risk linkage between the sovereign and banking sectors in the eurozone, and the mechanisms by which a sovereign debt crisis became a banking crisis. It will then explore the risk of “Japanisation” – an extended period of weak demand – in the eurozone.

The global financial crisis occurred after the “Paribas shock” of August 2007. The crisis was exacerbated by the real estate bubble in the US, and saddled the banking sector with significant liquidity problems. Subsequently, the “Greek shock” triggered the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, although it did not directly cause greater sovereign risk. The eurozone sovereign crisis had essentially been a result of the bubble bursting in 2007, and the consequent higher levels of sovereign debt that were taken on via countercyclical and bail-out policies. Prior to this, the eurozone had enjoyed robust economic development, and had recovered from the recession in the aftermath of the collapse of the US IT bubble in the early 2000s.

The first part of this chapter describes the mechanisms through which, after the global financial crisis, several linkages transferred risks between sovereign and banking

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